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A governance indicator for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) is presented. 
The  indicator  adopts  stakeholder  theory  in  selecting  its  elements,  which  also  include  a  few 
general governance principles as well as board features. 
  The paper reviews main governance indicators treated in the literature, which are mostly 
applied to publicly traded firms. It then proposes a specific indicator for SMEs which, in general, 
are private. The indicator takes into account—in its structure—the evaluation style of National 
Quality Awards, as a pattern to measure, by assigning points, a great number of variables. 
   Governance  variables  included  in  the  indicator  are  grouped  into  areas,  themes, 
dimensions  and  elements,  in  order  to  make  them  operative  and  measurable. Measurement  is 
performed by means of a questionnaire—reproduced as an appendix—with nominal and interval 
scales. Maximum  scores for  each  question are assigned  following  multiple  attribute  decision 
theory. The article concludes with reflections on the measurement problem in the social sciences 
and final thoughts on the characteristics of the proposed indicator. 
The paper, based on Yacuzzi (2007), is part of an on-going research project. In this new 
version, several sections of the original work have been improved, others have been deleted, and 
the questionnaire has been modified in order to incorporate the experience of different users. 
 
JEL: G34, M10. 
Keywords: Corporate governance indicator, stakeholder theory, boards, principles of corporate 
governance, multiattribute decision theory, measurement in the social sciences. 
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This  article  presents  a  governance  indicator  for  Small  and  Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs). The paper, based on Yacuzzi (2007), is part of an on-going research 
project. In this new version, several sections of the original work have been improved, 
others have been deleted, and the questionnaire has been updated in order to incorporate 
the experience of different users. 
The specialized literature deals with a great variety of governance indicators and 
indexes currently used in the world; however, most of them are indicators and indexes 
designed for studying the governance of publicly traded firms, while most SMEs are 
private firms. 
The paper defines the concept to be measured—SME governance—and it offers a 
list of its main elements. Many of these  elements will become parts of the designed 
indicator. Unlike a great number of existing indicators and indexes, which utilize finance 
theory to choose its elements, our indicator adopts stakeholder theory to this end. The 
indicator elements also include a few general governance principles, as well as board 
characteristics and work style. 
The profusion of resulting elements makes this indicator a practical checklist of 
desirable features for the governance of SMEs. While reviewing the indicator elements, 
business  firms  and  their  directors  and  managers  can  consolidate  SME  governance 
principles and practices: thus the indicator becomes a continuous learning mechanism. It 
can  also  become  a  basis  for  systematic  evaluation  of  SME  by  credit  institutions  and 
capital markets. 
  A section of the paper refers to Nacional Quality Awards (NQA). These awards 
use  a  complex  system  of  numerical  evaluation,  with  a  great  number  of  managerial, 
leadership, and results variables, including both financial and non-financial results. The 
proposed indicator takes into account—in its style, but not in its content—the evaluation 
method of NQA, as a pattern to measure, by assigning points, dozens of variables. 
  The indicator turns variables operational by grouping them into three areas, 16 
themes, 51 dimensions, and 103 elements. Variables can thus be measured. Measurement   3 
is performed by means of a 84-question questionnaire—reproduced as an appendix—with 
nominal and interval scales. 
Maximum  scores  assignable  to  questions  are  determined  by  applying  multiple 
attribute  decisión  theory.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  indicator’s  total  score  allows  a 
hierarchical order of firms according to the quality of their governance. Under this light, 
it is legitimate to determine element weights on the basis of preferences explicitly posed 
by governance experts. A detailed section explains the method to determine questionnaire 
scores. 
We  also  reflect  on  the  problems  of  measurement  and  justify  the  technical 
approach taken, as well as the importance of rigorously defining and measuring variables 
of interest. The final section looks deeper into the use of a great number of variables to 
build our indicator, and on the relative weight of its elements. 
The  indicator  systematize  diverse  theoretical  sources  and  turn  them  into  an 
internal and external benchmark of SME governance. As such, it allows a follow-up of 
key variables through time. The indicator is, in addition, an inventory of useful principles 
and practices, which orient organizational learning on SME’s governance and help to 
monitor its development. It could also serve as an element that contributes to create a 
firm’s credit profile. 
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE 
We  must  agree,  to  start  with,  on  what  concept  our  indicator  will  measure.  In 
Figure 1 we reproduce some definitions from Apreda (2007 a), which we adopt in this 
work: governance, private sector governance, and stakeholders. Of particular interest are 
the  words  in  italics,  since  one  way  or  another  they  will  become  elements  of  our 
governance indicator. 
SMEs have simple governance structures when compared with public, large firms. 
Nonetheless, they must adhere to principles, rules, procedures and good practices for 
good management; likewise, they must have mechanisms for representation and vote; all 
of its actors must assume their compromises and responsibilities; leaders must manage 
(or, better still, avoid) conflicts of interest among managers, creditors, owners and other 
stakeholders; and they must impose controls, incentives and performance standars for   4 
the  organization’s  participants.  In  addition,  directors  and  managers  must  exercise 
authority in decision processes. 
 
Governance: By “governance” we are to understand a field of learning and practice 
whose main tasks are: 
(a)  the  search  of  principles,  rules,  precedures  and  good  practices  that  allow 
organizations to be efficiently run within current institutions, at a certain date; 
(b) the design of mechanisms of representation, legitimate modes of wielding power, 
enforcement of rules and procedures, accountability, control, incentives and standards 
of performance to be applied to organizations; 
(c) the efficacious pursuit of goals and missions that ítem from the foundational charter 
and statutes of the organization. (Apreda (2003), p. 4.)  
Corporate  governance:  By  corporate  governance  is  meant  the  governance  within 
corporations and nearly alike organizations (including state-owned firms) that brings 
to focus the following subjects: 
·  Ownership structure 
·  Company’s founding charter, by-laws, statutes, and codes of good practice 
·  Board of directors and trustees; allocation of control decision rights 
·  Managers’ fiduciary duties towards owners and their management decision 
rights 
·  Investors’ property rights and protective covenants 
·  Conflicts  of  interest  between  managers,  creditors,  owners  and  other 
stakeholders 
·  Managers’ performance and incentives 
·  Rent-seeking and soft-budget constraints 
·  Production  and  disclosure  of  information  to  markets,  regulators  and 
stakeholders 
·  Accountability to regulators, stakeholders and investors 
·  Private, public and global gatekeepers (reputational intermediaries) 
·  National and international institutional constraints (the Judiciary, traditions, 
regulations and law enforcement). (Apreda idem pag 6) 
 
Stakeholders:  An  economic  or  political  agent  is  a  “stakeholder”  of  a  given 
organization when the following two conditions are met: 
·  The agent has a right to claim something from the organization, in a persisten 
way through time. 
·  The agent is affected both by success of the organization and by its failure in 
his or hers transactional environments. (Apreda (2007 a), p. 10.) 
 
 
Figura 1. Some important definitions. Source: Apreda (2003 a, 2007 a) (italics added.). 
 
The organization’s foundational chart and its code of good practices have also 
been considered at the time of designing the indicator. Boards—particularly—and the 
allocation  of  rights  in  control  decisions  and  management  decisions  are  an  important 
chapter of the indicator, and so are the production and timely diffusion of information   5 
(“transparency”)  and  compromise  and  responsibility  (“accountability”)  towards 
regulators and stakeholders. 
In this work, we adopt a governance approach focused on stakeholders, such as 
that  described  by  Clarke  (2004  b)  and  Blair  (2004).  According  to  this  approach, 
governance  must  promote  harmony  among  diverse  interests,  through  the  work  of 
directors and top management. Our choice does not imply, naturally, that we ignore the 
relevance of general governance principles and the importance of boards. 
We  make  no  reference  to  important  topics  in  “classic  governance”,  such  as 
ownership structure, property rights and protective covenants for investors. We do not 
deal either with tunneling, soft-budget constraint or opportunistic rents. The reason is that 
these topics are not so critical for SMEs today.  
 
III. THE MEASUREMENT OF GOVERNANCE
2 
Governance must be measured if we are to monitor its development. Different 
paths have been taken in order to measure it. Apreda (2003 a) mentions three approaches 
considered in the literature: econometrics, that leads to a governance index; comparative 
economics; and the governance slack model (Apreda (2002), (2003 b)). These approaches 
were originally thought of for large enterprises, but there is in them a core of concepts 
that can be equally applied to smaller firms. For example, Gompers et al. (2003) show, 
among other findings, that corporate governance becomes stronger with corporate by-
laws,  and  they  highlight  the  role  of  the  board  as  a  monitor  to  top  management. 
Comparative  economics  focuses  on  the  importance  of  institutions.  Finally,  the 
governance  slack  model  is  a  conceptual  framework  that  enhances  management’s 
accountability. 
More  recently,  Apreda  (2007  b)  has  developed  the  first  cardinal,  weighted 
governance index that appears in the specialized literature. This index applies both to 
publicly-owned firms and private firms. Unlike ordinal approaches, the index takes a 
quantitative  approach,  with  explicative  factors  and  a  weighting  system.  It  uses  six 
categories  of  variables:  the  board,  the  shareholders,  the  governance  architecture,  the 
                                                 
2 Esta sección se basa en Yacuzzi (2005 b).   6 
management,  the  creditors  and  the  gatekeepers  and  regulators.  The  six  families  are 
composed of  39 variables, although the autor makes clear that, in practical applications, 
analysts  and econometricians will be able to shorten the list on the basis of variable 
tractability, its relevance, research costs or statistical adjustment. Many of the model’s 
variables are not derived from statutory clauses but from practical governance issues and 
regulatory practices.  
In general, these concepts are as relevant for public firms as for private SMEs. In 
addition, general principles of governance, such as OECD (1999), Corporate Governance 
Committee (2001), and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) can serve 
as a basis for the creation of new indexes, applicable to all kinds of organizations. 
Indicators should have  a series of qualities: be quantifiable, easily measurable 
through  time,  presumably  relevant  for  financial  performance  or  risk;  they  should  be 
supported by accesible and complete data sets; and they should be articulated by bodies 
of leading advisors  (Foerster et al. (2004)).  Table 1 presents four alternative indexes and 
their components.  Foerster et al. (2004) offer ten components. Davis Global Advisors 
(2002)  make  an  internacional  comparisson  of  governance  practices  in  eight  central 
countries. Their Leading Corporate Governance Indicators (LCGI) are designed to give a 
unique indicator for each country. Creamer et al. (2004)  measure corporate governance 
through variables that include insider ownership, board structure, institucional ownership 
and  country-level  corporate  governance  indicators.  Institutional  Shareholder  Services 
(2002) has issued a governance index called Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) for 
Institutional  Investors.  CGQ  constructs  indexes  on  the  basis  of  up  to  61  variables, 
classified in eight areas. More than 7500 companies are classified. 
This revision of indexes, albeit incomplete, shows its variety and a common core 
of variables that consistently appear: the board, the CEO´s dual role, property rights and 
vote,  among  the  most  important.  These  elements  shaped  our  development  of  a  SME 
governance indicator. 
Studies  on  the  relationship  between  governance  and  performance  at  large 
enterprises use some measure of governance quality in order to establish the strength of 
this relationship. Yacuzzi (2005 a) reviews some of these studies, published in the last 
few years. We highlight a study by Gompers et al. (2003). By using the impact of more   7 
than 20 provisions, described in Table 2, the authors construct a governance index that is 
used as a proxy for shareholders’ level in some 1500 firms during the 90’s. Their general 
conclusion is that those firms with stronger rights have greater value, more benefits and 
greater sales growth; in addition, these firms show less capital expenses and make less 
corporate acquisitions. 
 
 Foerster et al. (2004)  Davis Global 
Advisors (2002) 
(LCGI) 
Creamer et al (2004)  Institutional 
Shareholder Services  
(2002) (CGQ) 
1.  Size of Board 
2.  Degree of board 
independence 
3.  Degree of independence for 
nominating, compensation 
and audit committees 
4.  Separation of positions of 
Chairperson and CEO 
5.  Director ownership 
6.  Dilution rate of 
executive/director stock 
option plans 
7.  Dual class share structure 
8.  Percentage of common 
shares owned by significant 
shareholders 
9.  Number of directorships per 
director 
10.  Percentage of directors who 
own more than $50.000 
worth of shares 






4. Split Chairman/ 
CEO 
5.  Board 
committees 
6. Voting rights 
7.  Voting issues 
8.  Accounting 
standards 
9. Executive pay 
10.   Takeover 
barriers 
 
1. Insider ownership 
2. Board structure: 
· outsiders on 
the board 
· board size 






indicators at the 
country level: 
· efficiency of 
the judicial 
system 
· rule of law 
· risk of 
expropriation 
· risk of contract 
repudiation 
· corruption 
· quality of 
accounting 
system 
· legal system 
 
1. Board of directors 
2. Audit 
3. Charter and by law 
provisions  
4. Takeover practices 




7. Ownership  
8. Director education 
 
Table 1. Components of a corporate governance index, from several authors.      8 
 
IV. SME GOVERNANCE AND ITS MEASUREMENT 
SME governance faces particular problems and characteristics that are treated in 
the literature.
3 Main characteristics are: lack of material, financial and human resources, 
limited managerial resources, less qualified personnel,  lack of strategic vision and long 
term plans, old  ways to organize work, lack of training policies, scarce information on 
markets and technologies, lack of innovation capacity. Due to these characteristics, and in 
spite of the importance of governance in el the development of a market economy, SMEs 





·  Blank check 
·  Classified board 
·  Special meeting 
·  Written consent 
Protection 
·  Compensation plans 
·  Contracts 
·  Golden parachutes 
·  Indemnification 
·  Liability 
·  Severance 
Voting 
·  Bylaws 
·  Charter 
·  Cumulative voting 
·  Secret ballot 
·  Supermajority 
·  Unequal voting 
Other 
·  Anti-greenmail 
·  Directors’ duties 
·  Fair price 
·  Pension parachutes 
·  Poisson pill 
·  Silver parachutes 
State 
·  Anti-greenmail Law 
·  Business Combination 
Law 
·  Cash-Out Law 
·  Directors’ Duties Law 
·  Fair Price Law 
·  Control Share Acquisition 
Law 
  
Tabla 2. Governance provisions. Please see Gompers et al. (2003) for details.   
 
Conceptual  frameworks  originally  built  to  understand  and  improve  the 
governance of publicly-traded firms must be adapted if applied to SMEs. There are clear 
differences between large firms and SMEs, for example, in the amount of disposable 
                                                 
3  Yacuzzi  (2005  a,  Apendix  A)  provides  general  characteristics  of  SMEs  around  the  world  and,  in 
particular, in Argentina. 
 
   9 
resources  and  in  the  relationship  between  shareholders  and  managers.  A  promising 
approach, of immediate relevance for SMEs, is proposed by Gabrielsson  (2003), who 
identifies  the  tasks  of  a  value-creating  board  with  the  help  of  four  theories:  agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory and stakeholder theory. These 
theories  provide  complementary  prescriptions  about  the  ways  in  which  boards  create 
value,  such  as  the  creation  of  business  opportunities  and  the  deployment  of  required 
resources. 
The study of boards, a core topic in the governance of large enterprises, is also 
key in the study of SME governance. Gabrielsson y Huse (2004) recommend that SMEs 
recruit external directors, for a number of reasons. On the basis of 53 studies of external 
directors in SMEs, the authors show how agency theory, resource based theory (RBT) 
and resource dependency theory help to understand the roles that external directors play 
at different firms, including family firms and venture capital firms. At any rate, different 
theories  provide  different  perspectives  on  the  concept  of  external  director,  and  these 
differences must be considered when judging the role of these directors. 
Contingency  theory  plays  an  important  role  in  the  study  of  management  and 
governance. Huse (2004) presents a corporate governance framework from a contingency 
approach. Among other important context factors, the author identifies the national and 
cultural environment, size and board behavior. An important contingency factor is the 
country in which the company operates (Steger (2004)). In general, SMEs have simpler 
governance  structures  than  larger  firms,  and  its  governance  themes  are  also  simpler 
(IBRF (2002)).  
 
V. A BACKGROUND ELEMENT FOR OUR INDICATOR: THE 
NATIONAL QUALITY AWARDS
4 
The  governance  index  we  propose  is  complex,  due  to  its  large  number  of 
elements. Ideally, we would like to have a simple governance measure, but this is not 
possible today. There are equally complex indicators in areas other than governance. One 
                                                 
4 This section is based on Yacuzzi (2006).    10 
of them is the measurement of leadership, management system, and performance that is 
included in many quality awards, such as Argentina´s National Quality Award.
5 
A fundamental idea behind these measurement systems is that “things that matter 
must be measured.” This is a century old idea, initially proposed by Lord Kelvin: 
"When  you can  measure  what  you are speaking about, and express it in  numbers,  you  know 
something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge of it is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but 
you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced it to the stage of science."
6 
If a company´s strategy emphasizes customer care, for example, measures of how 
the customer is being treated are fundamental. In short, the Award´s metrics define in 
detail measurement criteria, and suggest the need for multiple measures, both financial 
and non-financial. With small changes, these quality criteria and measures can be applied 
to SMEs. 
 
VI. MEASUREMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Some variables, such as temperature and area, can be objectively and precisely 
measured. In management research, however, there are hundreds of variables, such as 
compromise or leadership, that are subjective and difficult to measure. How do we handle 
such abstract concepts and measure them? We analyze them along their dimensions and 
elements, in what is called “operationalization”. 
 
Operationalization of variables 
Variable operationalization, that leads to the measurement of abstract concepts, is 
achieved  by  looking  at  the  concept  incorporated  in  each  variable  from  its  different 
dimensions and elements—observable and measurable. Let us examine, for example, the 
operationalization of the concept “position of the employees in the firm.”
7 This concept is 
part  of  our  SME  indicator  and  tries  to  measure  the  degree  of  consideration  than  the 
position  of  employees  ocuppy  in  the  mind  of  a  director.  Based  on  the  literature
8  we 
                                                 
5 The Argentine Award is very similar, in general, to other awards, such as the U.S. Malcolm Balrige 
National Quality Award. 
6 Thomson (1968). 
7 Sekaran (1992). 
8 See, for example, Apreda (2003 a), Apreda (2007 a), Blair (2004), Clarke (2004 b), and Yacuzzi (2005 b).   11 
consider that directors concerned about their employees will share the following general 
dimensions: 
(1) Salary. They will be concerned about their employees´ salary level. 
(2) Job security. They will think about providing job security to current 
employees through time.  
(3) Working conditions. They will be concerned about offering working 
conditions that are attractive and, at least, comparable to those offered 
by other industry competitors. Obviously, they will consider safety and 
ocuppational health. 
(4) Training. They will allocate important resources to train employees. 
(5)  Information.  They  will  keep  their  employees  informed  about 
company-related themes of potencial interest to them. 
(6) Feedback. They will promote the creation and maintenance of systems 
that collect personnel opinions and complaints.  
 
Governance dimensions at SMEs 
Dimensions (1) through (6) above describe the agenda of a director concerned 
about her employees as stakeholders. They explain the meaning of “employee position” 
to the eyes of a director, but measuring them requires further examination. One way to 
examine a dimension is to divide it in its constitutive elements. Constitutive elements are 
aspects in which dimensions show up as human behavior or administrative facts and can 
be measured more easily than dimensions. For example, if we take the salary dimension, 
directors’ concern about salary is an abstraction, while one of its possible constitutive 
elements, “the number of times per year salary level is considered at board meetings”, is 
an easily measurable element. Other elements that might be part of the salary dimension 
include  a  percentage  comparison  between  average  salary  paid  at  a  firm  for  a  given 
position and the average salary paid at the industry level for the same position. And so 
on. 
An alternative to examine dimensions in order to measure them is by means of a 
questionnaire with appropriate scales. For instance, a question about the salary dimension 
might be: “Please indicate the degree of validity for your firm of the following statement,   12 
using the scale provided: ‘Salary level is a major concern of top management in our 
company.’” And the question would be answered by choosing a value from a five-point 
scale, ranging from “Absolute disagreement” to “Absolute agreement”.  
Table 4 presents a list of dimensions for our governance indicator. Its columns 
are:  areas,  themes,  dimensions,  and  elements.  The  table  contents  are  deployed  with 
greater detail in the questionnaire (Appendix), which allows the calculation of the SME 
governance  indicator’s  value.
9  Generally  speaking,  each  question  corresponds  to  one 
element, although there are some exceptions. Notice that the dimensions of the concept of 
governance cover three areas: General principles of governance, stakeholders and board 
work. 
By  principles  of  governance  we  understand  “a  list  with  the  minimum  set  of 
prescriptions for action that emerge from the design for governance adopted for a given 
organization.”
10 Themes in this area are: explicit consideration of governance, provision 
of information, directors’representativeness and CEO duality. Of particular importance in 
the explicit consideration of governance are codes of good practice. There are various 
elements  in  the  area  of  provision  of  information,  but  worth  of  attention  are  the 
mechanisms that give informative transparency to the organization, both in accounting 
matters as well as in the diffusion of its general plans and achievements. The elements 
“directors’ representativeness” and “CEO duality” appear frequently in the literature (See 
Apreda (2007 a)). 
The  stakeholders  area  gets  much  room  among  the  elements  that  define  SME 
governance and its measurement. This should come as no surprise, since this work adopts 
stakeholder theory as the solution to the “dilemma of how to satisfy the competing claims 
of shareholders and the other stakeholders.”
11 Clarkson (1994) characterizes this theory 
as follows: “The firm is a system of stakeholders operating within the larger system of 
the host society that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm´s 
activities. The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stakeholders by 
                                                 
9 The questionnaire is fundamentally based on the following sources: CEF (ca. 2005), Gabrielsson (2003), 
Blair (2004) and Clarke (2004 b).  
10 Source: Apreda (2007 a), p. 24. 
11 Clarke (2004 b), p. 189.   13 
converting their stakes into goods and services.”
12 From a more economical approach, 
Margaret Blair adheres to the position that considers firms as institutional arrangements 
designed to regulate relationships among all parties that contribute to wealth creation 
with specific assets. “Put more simply, corporate resources should be used to enhance the 
goals and serve the purposes of all those who truly have something invested and at risk in 
the  enterprise.”
13  The  stakeholders  that  we  consider  in  our  indicator  fall  into  this 
characterization. 
                                                 
12 Quoted by (2004 b), p. 195. 
13 Blair (2004), p. 183.   14 
 
Area  Themes   Dimensions  Elements 
Explicit document on the importance of governance 1   
Documental (15)  Section on governance in the annual memory 2 









Appointment of a person to follow-up governance 
measures 5  
Actualization of accounting criteria 7  Transparency 
criteria (12)  Information on future performance objectives 8  
Appointment of a person responsible for information 







(28)  Existence of a mechanism to answer inquires from 
stakeholders 9 




membership (6)  Whether the CEO and the chairman of the board 
belong to the same family or group of control 11 





theme)   Independent 
directors (9)  Whether the chairman of the board is an independent 
director 13 














CEO duality (15) 
Whether the CEO is concurrently chairman of the 
board 15 
Search for value creation 16 
Search of benefit for the shareholder 17 
Search for 
economic benefit 
(155)  Search for future income 18 
Information that goes beyond that required by law 19 
Scope of accounting and other information 19 
Information 
transparency to 
shareholders (30)  Reports requested by minority shareholders 21 
Lack of 
complaints (15) 
Lack of complaints from shareholders  not in the 
board 20 







ers’ position  
(230) 
Control rights 
(30)  Veto rights of minority shareholders 23 
Average difference, in percentage, between 
company´s salary and industry´s salary 24 
 
Salary (40) 
Frequency of salary discussion at the board 24 
Rate of new job creation 25  Job security (12) 
  Turnover rate 25 
Indicators of safety and occupational health 26 
Working hours 26 
Benefits 26  




















Recreation area at the plant 26 
 
Table  4.  Indicator’s  dimensions  and  elements.  Numbers  between  brackets  show  the 
maximum score allowed. Numbers in the rightmost column refer to the question number 
corresponding to each element in the questionnaire.   15 
 
Area  Themes  Dimensions  Elements 
Average number of job-related training hours per year 
per employee 27 
 
 
Training (8)  Average number of job-unrelated training hours per 
year per employee 27 
Existence of information channels for exclusive use of 





Utilization of information channels: yearly number of 
informative actions of prioritary or exclusive interest 
to employees 28, 29 
Existence of systems for transmission of employee 











Degree of utilization of complaints and opinion 
system 30 
Product and service quality 31   
Quality (20)  Garantee policy and aftersales service try to achieve 
customer´s royalty 34 
Greatest possible value 32  Price (10) 
Least possible price 32 
Truthful publicity 33  Information (15) 
Complete information on products and services 33 
Existence of complaints 35 
Existence of lawsuits against the firm 35 











Existence of a system to know customer opinion 35 
Economic 
competence (14) 
Annual gross sales 36 
Cash flow 
management (5) 
Application of modern techniques 37 
Broad, updated, transparent 39 





Possibility for creditors to participate as observers at 
meetings 40 










(25)   
Complaints and 
lawsuits (3)  Existence of complaints from creditors against the 
firm 38 
Payment according to contract terms 44  Contractual 
conditions (25)  Search for a long-term relationship 41 
Supplier development programs 43  Supplier 
development  
(15) 
Training of suppliers to improve quality 42 

































lawsuits (15)  Existence of complaints from creditors against the 
firm 45 
 
Table 4 (Cont.). Indicator´s dimensions and elements.  Numbers between brackets show 
the maximum score allowed.  Numbers in rightmost column refer to the questionnaire.   16 
 
Area  Themes   Dimensions  Elements 
Job creation (2)  Existence of an explicit policy of job creation 46 
Adequate supply of information requested by 
government organs 48 
Facilitating 
government 
action (6)  Facilitation through publicity campaigns of 
government actions aimed towards general welfare 







(10)  Enhancing 
industry 
transparency (2) 
Supply of relevant information to strengthen free 
competition in industry 49 
Resource investment to strengthen facility and 
operational safety 50 
Collaboration with insurance companies and industry 






safety (35)  
Consultation with experts on industrial safety and its 
social impact 51 




Provision of information to the public on topics of 
general interest 53 
Savings in natural resources 55 
Campaigns to avoid damaging the environment 54 
 
Environment (4) 
Diffusion of social policies to protect the environment 
54 
































responsibility (2)  Concrete actions of corporate social responsibility 56 
Meeting frequency 57 
Presence of top management at meetings 58 
 
 
Meetings (10)  Existence of fix rules for meeting call, agenda 
distribution, preparations, etc. 62 
Division of labor among directors 59  Division of labor 
(6)  Division of labor between the board and the CEO 60 
Existence of rules on evaluation and follow-up of the 
board´s decisions 61 

















follow-up (4)   Existence of evaluations of the board´s work alter 
each meeting 64 
 
Table 4 (Cont.). Indicator´s dimensions and elements.  Numbers between brackets show 
the maximum score allowed.  Numbers in rightmost column refer to the questionnaire.   17 
 
Area  Themes   Dimensions  Elements 
Ability in areas of knowledge relevant to the firm 65 
Familiarity with industry conditions 66 
 
 
Knowledge (90)  Familiarity with firm operations 67 




(45)  Compromise during board meetings 69 
The board searches for strategic information by itself, 







(160)   
Information (25) 
The board makes acute questions to top management 






Existence of various types of directors at the board 72 
Conflicts of 
interest (25) 
Cases of conflicts of interest in a transaction that 
involves directors 73 
Disciplianary measures against the board or the 
management in the last three years 74 
 
Disciplinary 
measures (4)  Disciplinary measures against directors for violating 
their fiduciary duties in the last three years 75 











evaluation (4)  Existence of a board´s agenda on the evaluation of the 
management 77 
Iniciative (12)  Iniciation of decisions on markets, customers, 
employees, products, technologies, budgets, etc. 78 
Ratification of 
decisions (8) 
Ratification of decisions taken by managers on 
markets, customers, employees, products, 
technologies, budgets, etc. 79 
Support (10)  Support to managers for implementing decisions on 
markets, customers, employees, products, 








Monitoring (5)  Monitoring of decisions on markets, customers, 
employees, products, technologies, budgets, etc. 81 
Advice (26)  Advice on issues related to administration, legal, 
economic, financial, technical, marketing aspects, etc. 
82 
Influence on important parts of the environment to 



























Influence on important parts of the environment to 
support the firm and enhance its image 84 
 
Table 4 (Cont.). Indicator´s dimensions and elements.  Numbers between brackets show 
the maximum score allowed.  Numbers in rightmost column refer to the questionnaire. 
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The area of board work, finally, is based on studies such as Gabrielsson (2003), 
which  highlight  directors´  work  as  tools  for  value  creation  that  improve  SME 
performance. The relevance of the board´s work cannot be overlooked. A company´s 
good performance is related to the quality of its board´s work.  
 
VII. SCALES AND MEASUREMENT 
Having organizad concepts on the basis of the integration of theories, consultation 
of experts and executives, and inquire into organizations, they must be measured, in order 
to determine the intensity of opinions, perceptions, and attitudes of those interviewed. 
Concepts are measured with scales. In the questionnaire we propose to obtain the 
governance  indicator  for  SMEs,  we  include  70  questions  to  be  answered  by  interval 
scales and 14 questions to be answered by nominal (“Yes” or “No”) scales. Nominal 
scales present no difficulties, except in score assignation, a topic we treat in next section. 
Here we focus our attention on the characteristics of the interval scale we use. 
A typical question to be answered with a scale interval is shown in Figure 2. The 
questionnaire heading is reproduced, indicating the order number of the question, the 
question itself, its possible answers and the score assigned to each one; in addition, a 
column  allows  registration  of  the  score  that  best  reflects  the  company´s  situation. 
Question 1, “Has  your company issued some document that explicitly hightlights the 
importance  of  good  governance?”,  corresponds,  as  indicated,  to  the  area  of  “general 
principles of governance”, that has a maximum possible score of 200 points, and, inside 
that area, the question corresponds to the theme “explicit consideration of governance”, 
with a maximum possible score of 130 points. (The method to assign scores is explained 
in next section.) Possible answers and their meanings are the following: 
·  Strong “No”: No, and so far we have not considered the issue. 
·  Weak “No”: No, but we are considering the issue. 
·  Implementation: No, but we are in the process of implementation. 
·  Weak “Yes”: Yes, recently. 
·  Strong “Yes”: Yes.  
    19 
Num-
ber 
Questions  Answers and assigned score 
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 















a) Explicit consideration of governance (130 points) 
1  Has  your  company  issued  some  document 
that  explicitly  hightlights  the  importance  of 
good governance? 
 
0  2.5  5  6.5  7.5   
 
Figure  2.  Reproduction  of  a  question  from  the  questionnaire  used  to  obtain  the 
governance indicator for SMEs. 
 
A score is assigned to each answer. This assignment is not necessarily lineal, but 
reflects the way of thinking of the decision maker or governance expert that designed the 
question. It is based on a utility function associated with the existence at the firm of an 
explicit document dealing with the importance of governance. This function is presented 
both as a table and as a graph in Figure 3. 
For the first points in the scale, utility (value) increases linearly, with a growth 
rate  greater  than  for  higher  values;  for  higher  values,  the  growth  rate  flattens.  This 
implies that a decision maker highly values even small efforts to apply governance in 
SMEs, while—relatively speaking—he gives less incremental value to higher scores. 
Other  questions  have  assigned  scores  that  are  based  on  utility  functions  with 
different forms. Consider question 65, for example, “Indicate your degree of agreement 
or disagreement with the following statement: ´The board has general ability in at least 
two areas of knowledge that are relevant to the firm´”, which accepts as possible answers: 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total agreement with this statement.   
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Figure 3. Utility function that justifies the score selection in question 1. 
 
Scores  grow  very  slowly  for  the  first  three  points  in  the  scale,  and  then  they 
explode, as seen in Figure 4. This functional shape reflects the conviction, on the part of 
the expert that graduates the scores, that “a ´little ability´ is not worth much, because a 
critical mass of ability is required to make an effective board.” 
Finally,  questions  such  as  number  27,  “Indicate  your  degree  of  agreement  or 
disagreement with the following statement: ´My company devotes important resources to 
train its employees´, which accepts as possible answers the same alternatives recently 







             
1  0             
2  2             
3  5             
4  15             
5  30             
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
Figure 4. Utility function that justifies the choice of score for question 65. 
 
  VIII. DETERMINING THE QUESTIONNAIRE SCORES 
  Let us analize with greater depth questionnaire scores. Even if every question 
were perfect and  free from measurement errors (impossible features), and even if all 
important dimensions and elements were included, and irrelevant ones excluded, we still 
would have to deal with the hard problem of assigning importance to each question and 
to the sections in which questions cluster. In other words, in designing a measurement 
instrument, proper weight must be given to score graduation. 
In this work we calibrate maximum scores in each section by using a preference 
function  with  multiple  attributes.  This  method,  even  though  it  does  not  completely 
eliminate  arbitrary  scoring  decisions,  is  based  on  systematic  questionning  to  decision 
makers and governance experts about their preferences. The objective of the indicator is, 
in the last instance, to establish a hierarchical order among firms, according to the quality 
of their governance. The order is established on the basis of scores assigned to each firm. 
Let  us  consider  the  three  major  areas  that  define  the  concept  of  governance: 
principles of  governance, stakeholders  and the  board´s work. We must determine the 
weight of each area and, to that end, a preference function is built. At this stage we aim at   22 
finding  weights  for  each  of  the  three  areas;  later,  we  will  find  weights  for  themes, 
dimensions, and elements in Table 4. 
 Maximum scores assigned by the questionnaire to each area depend linearly on 
the  values  assigned  in  a  preference  function.  This  function  will  finally  establish  the 
hierarchical  ordering  of  firms  on  the  basis  of  their  governance  quality.  The  basic 
procedure to determine this preference function is described, and then we apply it to the 
assignment of scores to our questionnaire.
14 
 
Step 1. Preference function determination 
Preference function P is assumed additive, with the form: 
P(v1, v2, v3) = w1v1 + w2v2 + w3v3     (Equation 1) 
where P is preference, the vi are the values that the governance expert assigns to the areas 
of the questionnaire, and the wi, weights for each area. Weights and value functions are 
scaled in such a way that  
∑ = , 1 i w   1 0 £ £ i w    and 
        best vi( 1 ) = level  
        worst vi( , 0 ) = level  for i = 1 to 3, where i is the area. 
 A frequent doubt is related to the legitimacy of this additive model. We believe 
that it is sufficient to check the difference independence condition for each area. This 
condition establishes that the magnitud of the difference in the intensity of the preference 
between two levels in area i does not change when fixed levels in other areas change. Let 
us assume, for instance, that a decision maker is given two values, v1 = 0.1 and v1 = 0.7, 
where values 0.1 and 0.7 are taken from a 0-1 scale that measures the value assigned to 
the strenght of the area “principles of governance” in a firm; 0.7 is higher than 0.1. The 
decision maker is asked to answer if the intensity of her preference to go from 0.1 to 0.7 
is influenced by the fixed levels at other areas. (In other words, she is asked whether she 
would be conditioned, in choosing a firm with better governance principles, by the levels 
of areas “stakeholders” or “board´s work”.) If the levels of other areas do not affect the 
first area considered, then this area is considered difference independent from the rest. 
                                                 
14 The procedure follows in general that described by Buffa et al. (1987), with minor changes in the way to 
calculate unidimensional values.   23 
If the area does not pass the test, we can choose a model that takes into account 
interactions among areas, or else areas can be redefined so that difference independence 
is achieved. In our work, we follow the criteria of just one expert (the author), and the 
rationale to justify difference independence follows.
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“In the first place, let´s look at the relationship between the areas “principles of 
governance” and “stakeholders”: a firm with good governance must have solid principles 
of  governance,  regardless  whether  it  adopts  an  attitude  favorable  to  its  shareholders, 
employees, creditors, etc. In the second place, let us examine the relationship between the 
areas “principles of governance” and “board´s work”: the board could function properly, 
regardless of the existence of (explicit) solid principles of governance. In the third and 
last place, let us consider the relationship between the area “stakeholders” and “board´s 
work”:  a  board  could  function  properly,  be  involved  with  its  work  and  follow  a 
reasonable  routine  of  control  and  networking,  regardless  of  how  the  firm,  by  its 
philosophy of governance, considers the position of stakeholders.”  
Even  though  this  reasoning  is  preliminar  and  could  be  confirmed  by  better 
qualitative and quantitative análisis, Buffa et al. (1987, p. 702) maintain that additive 
preference functions are quite robust and, in most situations, will produce small errors, 
even when there is a moderate interaction among areas. 
 
Step 2. Construction of unidimensional value functions 
  An important problem is that of assigning values to governance areas, themes, 
dimensions, and elements. In what follows, we introduce a method to evaluate the value 
function vi belonging to area i. Similar reasoning would allow us to study value functions 
for themes, dimensions, and elements of the concept. It is common to establish a 0-1 
scale, where 0 indicates the worst level, and 1, the best level. These values emerge from 
utility functions that will depend on each decision maker or, in the case of a general use 
indicator, on the consensus of the comunity of governance experts at a given moment and 
place. For this work, we propose the utility functions shown in Figures 5, 6, and 7. 
                                                 
15 Future versions of this indicator should include opinions of a qualified group of governance experts. See 
Yacuzzi (2007, section V.2 Appendix V).   24 
The utility function of “general principles of governance”, shown as table and 
graph in Figure 5, was built so that it reflects the decision maker´s way of thinking. For 
the lower degrees of principle consolidation, the utility (or value) increases linearly, at a 
rate that is higher than that for upper degrees; for upper degrees, the growth rate flattens. 
This  implies  that  (relatively  speaking)  the  decision  maker  values  more  small  efforts 
towards SME governance than more advanced enhancements. The meaning of different 
degrees is shown in Table 5. This table is important, since it provides some objectivity to 










value   
 
           
Null  0  0             
In development  1  0.4             
Partial  2  0.7             
Total  3  0.9             
Level of 
excellence  4  1             
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
Figure 5. General principles of governance: utility function. 
 
Figure 6 shows the utility function for the stakeholders area. It is a linear function, 
that so reflects a “democratic” perspective concerning the importance of stakeholders: all 
stakeholders  are  important,  and  the  questionnaire  scores  add  value  whether  they  are 
assigned when considering shareholders or any other stakeholder. The meaning of the 
degree of consideration of stakeholders is presented in Table 6. 
   25 
Degee  Meaning 
Null 
consolidation 
Governance principles are either unknown or not mentioned at the firm. There are no 
references to them in director´s or manager´s daily discourse; at the most, there are 
isolated references. 
Consolidation 
in process of 
development  
The topic of governance principles starts to be developed, with some systematic order. 
For example, ad-hoc documents are issued, or some people are trainned in governance 
themes, or responsible persons are assigned to governance themes, or the organization 
works on a code of good practices. Issues such as the management of information and 
the representativeness of directors are given explicit attention. 
Partial 
consolidation 
There are evidences of a significative degree of implementation in all themes and 
dimensions  of  the  governance  concept.  For  example,  search  for  an  independent 
director  (so  far  there  were  none)  has  started,  a  code  of  good  practices  has  been 
enforced,  and  an  accounting  expert  has  been  contracted  to  update  the  delivery  of 




The company displays knowledge and application of solid governance principles at all 
levels. Internal and external documentation related to governance is up-to-date and 
available;  transparency  prevails  in  accounting  and  operational  areas.  The  board 
functions with efficiency and effectiveness in its governance. 
Excellence level 
The company has not only totally consolidated its governance principles, but it also 
exhibits its achievements to the industrial community, thus becoming a nacional and 
international model. In order to maintain governance principles, methods similar to 
those of continuous improvement in quality management are applied. 
 
Table 5. General principles of governance: Meaning of its degrees of consolidation. 
 
Finally, Figure 7 exhibits the utility function for the board´s work. The first points 
are not too highly valued: alter all, there are certain routines that all boards, no matter 
how shallow its work, must adhere to. However, values growth with greater slope when 
the percentage increases, in order to highlight the importance of a board that performs 
tasks that go beyond the minimum practice. 
Table 7 shows the meaning of the degree of effectiveness of the board´s work. 
Figures  5,  6,  and  7,  show  then  three  different  funtional  forms,  corresponding  to  the 
criteria of a decision maker or governance expert. On the basis of these utility functions, 
the expert can build tables and assign values. Other decision makers might have other 
criteria, and these could become explicit in other different utility functions. 












           
Null  0  0           
Mínimum  1  0.25           
Medium  2  0.5           
Large  3  0.75           
Maximum  4  1           
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
 
Figure 6. Utility function for the stakeholders area. 
 
Degree   Meaning 
Null 
amplitude 
Concern for shareholders holds absolute priority. In spite of that, there is little 
or null information transparency, and little or null opportunities for dissatisfied 




Concern  for  the  shareholder  holds  priority,  but  other  stakeholders,  such  as 
customers or suppliers, are considered as well.  Aside from the shareholder, 
stakeholders  only  get  partial  attention:  for  example,  employee  training  is 




Several  stakeholders  receive  attention  from  top  management,  including 
shareholdes,  employees,  customers  and  suppliers.  In  addition,  for  each 





At least five out of seven stakeholders are closely atended to. Atention, in this 
context, means that, for each stakeholder, at least two or three dimensions are 




All  stakeholders  are  considered  in  all  dimensions.  For  each  dimension,  all 
elements receive at least some degree of consideration. At all levels in the firm 
there exists a “culture of stakeholders”. 
 
Table 6. Meaning of the degrees of amplitude in the consideration of stakeholders. 











             
Null  0  0             
Minimum  1  0.1             
Medium  2  0.25             
Large  3  0.6             
Maximum  4  1             
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
 
Figure 7. Utility function for the board´s work. 
 
Step 3. Determination of important weights for each area (wi) 
  The most important area is identified first. This is an arbitrary decision, although 
it reflects a philosophical position towards governance; if necessary, the effect of this 
choice can be evaluated through sensitivity analysis. Let “stakeholders” be our area of 
greatest  importance.  In  order  to  evaluate  weights  we  ask  the  following  question: 
“Consider firm A, with the worst level in its “principles of governance”, v1 = 0, and the 
best level in “stakeholders”, v2 = 1. Consider now another firm, B, with v1 = 1, the best 
level for its “principles of governance”. What should be level v2 for this firm B so that 
you would be indiferent (as an  external expert that evaluates this firm´s governance) 
between choosing A or B? 
Assume that the answer is v2 = 0.6
16, i.e, decision maker at firm B is willing to 
trade-off  part  of  stakeholders  consideration  in  order  to  have  perfect  principles  of 
governance. By using equation 1 this situation is presented as: 
  w1v1 (worst level of principles) + w2v2 (best level of stakeholders)= 
  = w1v1 (best level of principles) + w2 x 0.6 
                                                 
16 This means that v2 = 0.6 emerges objectively from the utility function and the description of degrees in 
Table 6. Taking intermediate values is legitimate.   28 
w1 x 0 + w2 x 1 = w1 x 1 + w2  x 0.6 
Rearranging  this expression, we have: 
  0.4 w2 = w1            Equation 2  
 
Degree  Meaning 
Null effectiveness 
The board has no work routine. Directors do not even have a clear 
conciousness about their role. They do no meet beyond what the law 
establishes  and  they  present  an  insignificant  level  of  ability  and 
compromise  with  the  organization.  The  board  does  not  evaluate 
management and, even if there are no conflicts of interest, the board´s 
behavior is negative or null. Directors do not perform tasks of control, 
monitoring, or networking, nor do they provide advice to managers. 
Minimum 
effectivenes 
The  board  understands  the  importance  of  its  role,  but  this 
understanding  does  not  translate  into  innovative  action  or  control 
behavior,  due  to  a  limited  level  of  ability  and  compromise  from 
directors. Just two or three themes of the board´s  work  are treated, 
albeit insufficiently, in one or two dimensions each. 
Medium 
effectiveness 
The board is reasonably competent and is involved in all dimensions of 
the  “ability  and  competente”  theme.  In  addition,  it  takes  forward  a 
regular routine, and duly excersises monitoring and control activities. 
The  board  develops  advising  and  networking  tasks,  but 
unsystematically. 
Large effectiveness 
All themes related to the board´s work are considered: routine, ability 
and compromise, composition and behavior of the board, control and 
monitoring,  and  advice  and  networking.  In  addition,  at  least  three 
dimensions are covered for each theme. 
Maximum 
effectiveness 
All themes and all dimensions are properly considered. A culture of 
continuous improvement is alive, applied to the board´s work. There 
are even written procedures to evaluate the board´s effectivenes.  
 
Table 7. Meaning of the degrees of effectivenes in the board´s work. 
   
Next we pose an analogous question for the remaining area. “Consider firm A, that has 
the worst level in its board´s work, v3 = 0, and the best level in “stakeholders”, v2 = 1. 
Consider now another firm, B, with v3 = 1, the best level in its board´s work. What 
should level v2 be for this firm B so that you were indifferent (as an external expert that 
evaluates  this  firm´s  governance)  between  choosing  A  or  B?”  If  your  answer  to  this 
question were v2 = 0.3 then: 
w3v3 (worst level in board´s work) + w2v2 (best level in stakeholders) 
  = w3v3 (best level in board´s work) + w2 x 0.3 
w3 x 0 + w2 x 1 = w3 x 1 + w2  x 0.3 
Rearranging this expresion, we get:   29 
  0.7 w2 = w3           Equation 3 
The sum of weights must equal unity, i.e.: 
  w1 + w2 + w3 = 1         Equation 4 
Therefore, with equations 2, 3 and 4: 
0.4 w2 + w2 + 0.7 w2  = 1 
2.1 w2 = 1 
w2 = 0.48 
and, as a consequence: 
w1 = 0.4x 0.48 = 0.19 
w3 = 0.7 x 0.48 = 0.33 
From these calculations, importance weights for the three areas are estimated: w1 
= 0.19, w2 = 0.48 y w3 = 0.33. Since our procedure is approximate, not much is lost by 
rounding these values to: w1 = 0.2, w2 = 0.5 y w3 = 0.3. 
 
Step 4.  Global values calculation 
  Equation 1 allows us to calculate our preference for a given firm as a function of 
its governance quality. We will have, for instance: 
P(v1, v2, v3) = w1v1 + w2v2 + w3v3 = 
= 0.2 x 0.75 + 0.5 x 0.70 + 0.3 x 0.45 = 0.635 
This value is multiplied by 1000 in order to generate an indicator that covers the 
range from 0 point through 1000 points. This operation is a simple arithmetic step that 
does not affect comparissons made with the governance indicator. 
 
Step 5. Sensitivity analysis 
  The  previous  line  of  reasoning  might  be  affected  by  subjectivity.  Subjectivity 
covers both the selection of weights for each area and the assignment of its values. In 
order to increment confidence in the indicator´s performance, sensitivity analysis could 
be performed. A possible way to conduct this analysis is the following: 
·  take a set of firms and evaluate its governance with the developed indicator, with 
the base values;   30 
·  establish a ranking for these firms on the basis of the results obtained with the 
indicator; 
·  obtain  other  (or  others)  indicator  (or  indicators)  by  changing  values  (utility 
function) and weights in steps 1 through 4 above; 
·  establish a new ranking of firms with the new indicator; 
·  compare  results.  If  they  agree,  our  level  of  confidence  in  the  indicator  will 
increase; otherwise, it would be convenient to make a more profound study of the 
philosophy of governance and look for more information, in order to find a more 
consistent indicator. 
Sensitivity to the utility function used could also be measured. Yacuzzi (2007, 
Apendix V, shows this case). A further way to conduct sensitivity analysis is to compare 
the  weights  that  different  decision  makers  or  experts    assign  to  different  governance 
areas, by following steps 1 through 4 above. If weights are approximately equivalent, our 
confidence in the indicator will increase. Important differences would reflect different 
understandings of governance, as shown in Yacuzzi (2007,  Appendix V, second section). 
  
IX. APPLICATION TO QUE QUESTIONNAIRE 
In  the  previous  section  we  have  shown  how  weights  can  be  systematically 
assigned  to  the  three  areas  of  governance.  Something  similar  can  be  done  to  assign 
weights to different themes in each area; to different dimensions in each theme; and, 
finally,  to  different  elements  in  each  dimension  (although  in  this  work  we  follow  a 
different way to assign weights to the elements). 
The  method  is  applied  to  weight  themes  from  the  stakeholders  area.  The 
generalized preference function in Equation 1 will be used, but new subscripts will be 
added in order to clearly specify weights, values, and percentages of the maximum score 
for each theme or dimension in the questionnaire. In the following equation, for example: 
P(v11, v12, v13, v14) = w11v11+ w12v12 + w13v13 + w14v14 
the  first  subscripsts  refer  to  the  area  “principles  of  governance”  and  the  second 
subscripsts  refer  to  the  four  themes  that  conform  the  area:  “explicit  consideration  of 
governance”,  “provision  of  information”,  “directors´  representativeness”  and  “CEO 
duality”, respectively. Likewise, in the equation:   31 
P(v111, v112) = w111v111 + w112v112 
the  first  subscripts  refer  to  the  area,  the  second,  to  the  theme,  and  the  third,  to  the 
dimensions (“documental” and “organizational”).  
Table 8 (a) schematically shows the result of a line of reasoning, similar to that of 
previous section, conducted to weight themes from the area “stakeholders”. We assume 
that the most important theme is “position of the shareholders”. This could be different: 
in Japan many people feel that “the company belongs to its employees”; naturally, this 
way of thinking would take us to different weights. 
Notice that in choosing the value of “v21 necessary for indiference” between firms 
A and B there exists the implicit idea of a decision maker´s utilitiy function. The reader 
might want to check his understanding of the reasoning by following one or two lines in 
Table 8 (a). Table 8 (b) is a summary of the w2j values calculated.  
  
 
Firm A  Firm B 
i 









2  Employees  0  1  Employees  1  0.65  0.35 
3  Customers  0  1  Customers  1  0.75  0.25 
4  Creditors  0  1  Creditors  1  0.9  0.1 
5  Suppliers  0  1  Suppliers  1  0.75  0.25 
6  Government  0  1  Government  1  0.95  0.05 
7  Society  0  1  Society  1  0.8  0.2 
 
Table 8 (a). Summary of calculations to determine weights for different stakeholders. 
“Shareholders” is assumed to be the most important theme. 
 
Theme  Coefficient  Value 
Shareholders  w21  0.45 
Employees  w22  0.16 
Customers  w23  0.11 
Creditors  w24  0.05 
Suppliers  w25  0.11 
Government  w26  0.02 
Society  w27  0.09 
  Total  1.00 
 
Tabla 8 (b). Weight calculation results.   32 
At this point we have calculated the weights wij for the three areas and the seven 
themes of area stakeholders. Yacuzzi (2007, Appendix III) shows with some detail some 
further calculations for areas, themes and dimensions. The whole set of calcultations is 
available in Yacuzzi (2007).  
The following criterion is adopted for the elements: If a dimension is made from 
just one element, then, the weight of the element is equal to the weight of the dimension; 
if the dimension is made from n elements, the weight of each element is (1/n) times the 
weight of the dimension. We could have calculated each element´s weight by using a 
preference  function  as  we  did  with  areas,  themes,  and  dimensions  but,  for  practical 
reasons, we chose the laplacian criterion that gives equal weight to each element in a 
given dimension. 
We are ready to assign points to each element. Following the Nacional Quality 
Award scoring standard, we assign a total number of points in the range from 0 point to 
1000 points. Given the weights of the governance areas, points are assigned as follows: 
·  General principles of governance: w1 * maximum score to be assigned = 0.2 * 
1000 = 200 points. 
·  Stakeholders: w2 * maximum score to be assigned  = 0.5 * 1000 = 500 points. 
·  Board´s work: w3 * maximum score to be assigned = 0.3 * 1000 = 300 points. 
In a similar way points are assigned to themes in each area. For example, for the 
area  of  “general  principles  of  governance”,  where  the  total  number  of  points  to  be 
assigned (TPA1) is 200, assignation becomes: 
·  Explicit consideration of governance: w11 * TPA1 = 0.67 * 200 = 133 (130). 
·  Provision of information: w12 * TPA1 = 0.2 * 200 = 40 (40). 
·  Directors´ representativeness: w13 * TPA1 = 0.067 * 200 = 13 (15). 
·  CEO duality: w14 * TPA1 = 0.067 * 200 = 13 (15). 
Calculated  values  were  rounded  to  the  values  in  parenthesis,  without  any 
important loss in relevance. 
Calculations  of  points  for  the  remaining  themes  and  dimensions  are  similar; 
results are displayed in Table 4, in each cell and between brackets. Notice, finally, that in 
this work the concept of utility function is used in two related but different contexts: on 
the  one  hand,  it  is  used  to  assign  values  (utilities)  to  the  degrees  of  consolidation,   33 
amplitude, or effectiveness of diverse areas, themes and dimensions (see, for example, 
Figures 5, 6, and 7); this use allows assinging points to the indicator´s areas, themes and 
dimensions; on the other hand, the concept is used in the questionnaire to assign points to 
different possible answers in questions with five possible answers; this usage is illustrated 
in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
X. REFLECTIONS ON MEASUREMENT 
Does this technical approach to SME governance measurement make sense? We 
believe  it  does.  Is  such  a  complex  questionnaire  necessary?  We  believe  it  is.  Our 
indicator aims at answering a simple question: “How good is this firm´s governance?” As 
a first approximation, it would be enough to say “very good”, or “poor”; after all, in 
many cases, management intuition and “feeling” are strong tools for decision making. 
However, the concept of governance is complex and there are many possible perspectives 
on its content. The structure we propose: areas, themes, dimensions, and elements, is a 
first step towards clarifying the concept of governance that our indicator tries to measure. 
Much has been written on measurement. We have already quoted Lord Kelvin, 
who  wrote  a  century  ago.  Let  us  take  now  a  quotation  from  Robert  B.  Laughlin: 
(Laughlin (2007), p. 32, author´s translation) 
“We know that measurements are never perfect and that is why we want to know how 
precise a given measure is, which is an adequate practice as it avoids dishonesty and 
discourages elaboration of reports with no scientific value.” 
It can be argued that Laughlin is a physicist that talks about physics, which is true, 
but his words make even more sense in social research! Our detailed explanation on how 
the indicator is built helps to understand its precision and increases user confidence. On 
the other hand, all the technology we used to build the indicator is displayed in this work, 
so that any reader can construct her own indicator, if she so wishes.
17 Laughlin (2007) 
continues:  
“When I go to meetings where I meet other physicists and talk with them about things 
that interest us, one of the topics that always comes to the surface is a conference by 
Irving Langmuir, the inventor of the tungsten lamp. In that conference, the American 
scientist  talks  about  pseudoscience  and  relates  cases  of  scientific  falseness  and 
deceptions, but the most important thing is the fundamental message that he conveys: in 
physics, correct perceptions differ from erroneous ones in that the former become more 
                                                 
17 Needless to say, interfirm comparissons are meaningful only when a given indicator is widely accepted, 
but, in principle, any firm could have its own governance indicator.   34 
clear  when  experimental  precision  improves.  It  is  a  simple  idea  that  captures  the 
physicist´s mind and explains his obsession with mathematics and numbers. By means of 
precision falseness is shown up” (p. 37, author´s translation). 
For us, social researchers, Langmuir´s message is as much valid, or even more, 
than for physicists. Since we rarely conduct experiments, we must be as rigorous as the 
physicist in using our measurement instruments, and we must work hard to define in 
detail the phenomena we try to measure. 
The  methodology  used  in  this  paper  oriented  our  work  on  a  solid  basis.  It  is 
relevant at this point the thought of Keeney et al. (1976, p. 9) on decisions with multiple 
objectives: “The spirit is one of Socratic discovery—of unfolding what you really relieve, 
of convincing  yourself,  and of deciding” (italics in the original). Formal analysis has 
further  advantages:  it  provides  “psychological  comfort”,  facilitates  communication, 
allows persuation of third parties, systematize concept evaluation, and leads to finding 
gaps or redundancy in what we measure. These advantages keep their validity even in 
cases where the evaluation of governance quality is based on intuition. 
“You cannot quantify what is not quantifiable” is a much quoted criticism. Let us 
go back to Keeney et al. (1976, p. 12): 
“The question is: What is quantifiable?  An art expert might be hard pressed to give an 
objective formula for ranking the quality of paintings; nevertheless, he might be able to 
rank order these paintings saying, in effect, that given a choice between two paintings he 
would prefer one over the other. And, where we have rank orders, numbers can´t be far 
behind. Our artist might even be willing to put a price tag on each painting, thereby 
quantififying one aspect of his subjective judgement. This sort of quantification is not 
done by means of an objective formula but by subjective introspection. Is it legitimate to 
work  with  such  numbers?  We  do  it  all  the  time.  As  analysts  we  must  learn  how  to 
incorporate such soft, squishy considerations as aesthetics, psychic factors, and just plain 
fun into our analyses. If we don´t, the hard will drive out the soft and efficiency—very 
narrowly interpreted—will prevail.” 
    Another source of skepticism is the hypothetical nature of questions posed 
to managers by experts in order to establish a ranking of preferences. Simple, 
apparently  unrealistic,  questions  are  used  to  inquire  in  complex  subjects  in  a 
complex  world.  In  fact,  these  questions  are  simple,  but  their  answers  are  the 
fundamental  components  that  allow  to  calculate,  for  example,  weights  in  a 
preference  function.
18  Without  these  simple  questions,  finding  preference 
functions would be complex. 
                                                 
18 Questions must be precise and understandable. See Keeney et al. (1976, p. 18).   35 
The elements of our indicator of SME governance have two key features: they are 
relevant  and they  are measurable. Relevant means that, from its knowledge, decision 
makers  have  useful  information  to  evaluate  some  governance  dimension.  Measurable 
means that the decision maker can discriminate between different levels of each element. 
All the indicator´s elements, taken as a whole, must meet some properties. The set 
must  be  complete  (the  questionnaire  must  cover  all  relevant  aspects  of  a  theory  of 
goveranance),  operative  (elements  must  be  measurable),  descomposable  (governance 
complexity must be divided into smaller, more treatable, problems), non redundant (the 
questionnaire must avoid double accounting) and minimum (to keep the questionnaire 
within reasonable limits).
19 Finally, we add to this list the feature of explanatory power. 
In-depth knowledge of the concept of governance will allow causal explanations of the 
impact that each element has on governance quality.  
 
XI. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Our indicator is built on 84 questions. Undoubtedly, they are too many questions 
to be answered by a hurried executive during—say—a window in his agenda between 
two important meetings, but they are not too many questions for a firm´s directors willing 
to evaluate the status of its firm´s governance and reflect about it. 
Who must answer the questionnaire? The first possible answer is: “the board”, 
and,  in  fact,  the  board  has  all  the  required  information  to  answer  the  questions;  in 
addition, it is the board who might benefit the most from the exercise. Another possible 
answer  is:  “other  stakeholders,  perhaps  working  in  team”.  Another:  “people  from 
academia who are studying cases on SME governance”. And another: “gatekeepers, who 
would benefit from an in-depth understanding of SME governance”. Etcetera. 
 Ours is not, as we see, an indicator amenable to be automatically estimated with a  
a large data base with economic-financial information. It is rather a quantitative cheklist, 
a  map  for  good  SME  governance.  The  checklist  could  be  annually  analyzed  in  the 
context, for example, of an ISO 9000 program. As the board assigns points to governance 
elements, it learns about them and their relevance to the firm. 
                                                 
19 These features are taken from Keeney et al. (1976, p. 50) and we deem them valid even though we use 
them in a different context.   36 
 Unlike maximum possible scores used in National Quality Awards evaluations 
and other similar evaluation systems, which usually offer a maximum of 10 to 20 points 
to each question, this questionnaire has possible maxima that differ between them in one 
and even two orders of magnitude (maxima range from 1 point through 55 points). This 
lack of balance is made clear by a Pareto analysis: out of 16 themes in the indicator, the 
four most “bulky” cover 60% of the maximum amount of points, whereas the last four 
themes, only 4%.
20 These figures could be an invitation for directors and managers to 
concentrate efforts in the few themes that contribute the most to a solid goverance. In this 
sense they are a compass for action.  
In addition, Pareto analysis suggests the possibility to create a more parsimonious 
indicator, with fewer questions. However, we present three objections against this course 
of action. In the first place, current scores represent the author´s perspective and they 
could be modified with other perspectives. On the other hand, if themes and elements 
with small scores are eliminated, the value of the questionnaire as a checklist of themes 
and elements of SME governance is also diminished; its application as a complementary 
tool  of  the  evaluation  of  the  type  performed  by  National  Quality  Awards  would  be 
limited, and its trainning value for directors and managers would also decrease. Finally, 
governance is an evolving concept and it is possible that elements that today rank low in 
the  list  of  maximum  possible  scores  change  their  relative  ranking  in  the  future. 
Elimination from the questionnaire would deprive them of visibility for future evaluation 
instances; and it would exclude them from the conciousness plane of a devoted director 
aiming at having an innovative firm that strives hard to improve its governance. 
  Finally,  we  firmly  believe  that  SME  can  and  must  be  measured.  Through  its 
measurement, managers and directors improve the understanding of their problems, and 
the organization as a whole learns the meaning and scope of concepts that, at least in its 
systematic  treatment,  are  new  for  most  members  of  a  firm.  Continuous  improvement 
occurs. Mario Kutnowski comments on SME are important here:
21 
“A main obstacle for growth and diversification of SMEs in Argentina lies in the huge 
difficulty to access external financing, either through bank credit or bond emission. For 
various reasons, including deficiency in the collection, processing, and presentation of 
                                                 
20 Notice that we do not discuse, at this stage of the indicator´s development, the statistical or econometric 
significance of variables. 
21 Kutnowski, Mario, personal communication, November 22, 2007.   37 
reliable performance data; insufficiency of collateral; or unstable structures, they capture 
only a minor portion of the savings available in the market. However, SMEs represent an 
important source of employment and often they treasure valuable innovation projects and 
ventures.” 
And from these thougths Kutnowski highligths the importance of  “promoting a 
social balance for SMEs, with the explicit purpose of improving its access to financing” 
and of “developing a methodology to value intangible assets.” Following Kutnowski, we 
sincerely believe that the indicator here proposed, adequately improved, could serve to 
complete a credit profile useful for capital markets, in addition to serve as a tool for 
learning, improvement and internal and external benchmarking at SMEs.   38 
APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DETERMINING THE SME GOVERNANCE 
INDICATOR 
Instructions for Section I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE (Page 
38) 
The questions in this section refer to general principles of governance. Please, indicate 
the degree of observance that these principles have at your company, using the scales 
provided. After choosing your answer, write down the score indicated in column “Your 
firm´s score”. These scores will later be added in the “Total results” form, at the end of 
the questionnaire.  
 
Instructions for Section II: STAKEHOLDERS (Page 40) 
In  this  section  we  inquire  about  your  firm´s  stakeholders:  shareholders,  employees, 
customers, creditors, suppliers, government and general public, including environmental 
considerations.  Please,  indicate  the  degree  of  valididy  of  each  statement  for  your 
company, using the scales provided. After choosing your answer, write down the score 
indicated in column “Your firm´s score”. These scores will later be added in the “Total 
results” form, at the end of the questionnaire.   
 
Instructions for Section III: BOARD´S WORK (Page 44) 
In  this  section  we  inquire  about  the  working  style  of  your  company’s  board.  Please 
answer  either  “Yes”  or  “No”  to  questions  57  through  64,  and,  for  the  remaining 
questions, establish your degree of agreement or disagreement with the statements, using 
the  scales  provided.  After  choosing  your  answer,  write  down  the  score  indicated  in 
column “Your firm´s score”.  In the  final page  of the questionnaire  you will find the 
“Total results” form, where you can make a summary of partial and total scores of your 
company’s governance.   39 




Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 















a) Explicit consideration of governance (130 points) 
1  Has  your  company  issued  some  document 
that  explicitly  hightlights  the  importance  of 
good governance? 
 
0  2.5  5  6.5  7.5   
2  Does your company´s annual memory have a 
section  devoted  to  its  performance  in 
implementing  governance  principles,  in 
addition  to  the  provisions  indicated  by  the 
regulatory framework? 
0  2.5  5  6.5  7.5   
3  In  addition  to  the  principles  of  governance 
indicated in the corporation´s chart or internal 
by-laws, does your company have a code of 
ethics,  or  code  of  behavior,  or  credo,  that 
includes governance principles? 
0  9  18  24  27.5   
4  Does your company stick to a code of good 
practices? 
0  9  18  24  27.5   
5  Is there a person responsible for checking the 
introduction and enforcement of governance 
measures at your company? 
0  20  40  52  60   
b) On information provision (40 points) 
6  Does  exist  in  your  company  a  person 
responsible  for  providing  accounting  and 
other information to markets and regulators, 
in  order  to  strenghten  information 
transparency?  
0  5  10  12  14   
7  Are  accounting  criteria  systematically 
updated at your company in order to improve 
accounting transparency? 
0  2  4  5  6   
8  Does  your  company’s  management  inform 
about  expected  performance  objectives  for 
upcoming years? 
0  2  4  5  6   
9  Does  exist  in  your  company  a  mechanism 
that allows prompt answers to questions from 
stakeholders about topics of their interest? 
0  5  10  12  14   
                                                 
·  Strong “No”: No, and so far we have not considered the issue. 
·  Weak “No”: No, but we are considering the issue. 
·  Implementation: No, but we are in the process of implementation. 
·  Weak “Yes”: Yes, recently. 
·  Stron “Yes”: Yes.  





Questions  Answers and assigned score 
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
GOVERNANCE (200 POINTS) (Cont.) 




c) Directors´ representativeness (15 points) (
· · · ·) 
10  Does the CEO or his/her family (children, 
siblings, direct nephews, wife, husband, 
brothers or sisters in-law, or their children) 
hold positions in the board? 
0  3   
11  Do the CEO and the chairperson of the board 
belong to the same family or control group?   
0  3   
12  Is the board integrated by non-independent 
directors only? 
0  4.5   
13  Is  the  chairperson  of  the  board  a  non-
independent director? 
0  4.5   
d) CEO duality (15 points) 
14  Is the CEO a permanent director on the firm’s 
board? 
0  7.5   
15  Is the CEO the chairperson of the board as 
well? 
0  7.5   
                                                 
·  If  your  company  does  not  consider  that  its  situation  related  to  its  directors´  representativeness  is 
suboptimal,then you can assign the maximum score to questions 10 to 15 and continue with question 16.   41 




Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 




a) On the position of shareholders at the firm (230 points) 
16  Searching  for  value  creation  for  the 
shareholder  (measured,  for  example,  by 
return on assets) is a core motivation for top 
management. 
0  14  27.5  41  55   
17  Searching the benefit for the shareholder is a 
core motivation for top management. 
0  12.5  25  37.5  50   
18  Future  shareholders´  income  is  a  core 
concern of top management. 
0  12.5  25  37.5  50   
19  By management orders, areas responsible for 
the  preparation  of  accounting  and  other 
documents  report  on  the  company  situation 
and its future perspectives with greater scope 
than that established by law. 
0  4  7.5  11  15   
20  The board does not receive complaints from 
shareholders that are not part of  it. 
0  4  7.5  11  15   
21  Frequently, reports are prepared at the request 
of minority shareholders. 
0  4  7.5  11  15   
22  There exist mechanisms for the minority 
shareholders to freely sugest themes for the 
board’s agenda.  
0  4  7.5  11  15   
23  Minority shareholders have veto power on 
key comercial and operative decisions. 
0  4  7.5  11  15   
b) On the position of employees at the firm (80 points) 
24  Employees’ salary level is a core concern of 
top management. 
0  10  20  30  40   
25  Job  security  for  our  employees  is  a  core 
concern of top management. 
0  3  6  9  12   
26  Working  conditions  at  our  firm  are  a  core 
concern of top management. 
0  3  6  9  12   
27  My company devotes important resources to 
train its employees. 
0  2  4  6  8   
 
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   
   42 
Num-
ber 
Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
2. STAKEHOLDERS (500 POINTS) 




28  Periodic reports issued by the company have 
its employees as an important target. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
29  My company regularly issues news for its 
employees (newsboard, etc.). 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
30  There  exist  systems  to  transmit  complaints 
and opinions from the personnel. 
0  1  2  3  4   
c) On the position of customers (55 points) 
31  Obtainning  product/service  quality  for  our 
customers is a fundamental objective in our 
firm.  
0  2.5  5  7.5  10   
32  Our  top  management  strives  to  provide  our 
customers  the  greatest  value  at  the  lowest 
possible price.  
0  2.5  5  7.5  10   
33  Our publicity, brochures, and sales literature 
convey a complete and truthful image of our 
products/services features.  
0  4  7.5  11  15   
34  Our warranty policy and after-sale service is 
efficient  and  tries  to  maintain  customer 
loyalty. 
0  2.5  5  7.5  10   
35  There are no complaints from customers.  0  2.5  5  7.5  10   
d) On the position of banking and non-banking creditors (25 points)  
36  Economic capacity is the core concern of our 
company. 
0  3.5  7  10.5  14   
37  Our accounting department applies the most 
modern techniques for forecasting cash flow 
and other financial variables. 
0  1.25  2.5  3.75  5   
38  There are no claims from our creditors.  0  0.75  1.5  2.25  3   
39  Our financial information is broad and is 
available on the Internet to our creditors. 
0  0.375  0.75  1.125  1.5   
40  Our creditors are allowed to participate as 
observants in our meetings. 
0  0.375  0.75  1.125  1.5   
e) On the position of our suppliers (55 points) 
41  Our company makes every possible effort to 
guarantee  our  suppliers  a  long-lasting 
relationship.  
0  3  6.25  9  12.5   
 
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   
   43 
Num-
ber 
Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
2. STAKEHOLDERS (500 POINTS) 




42  We  train  our  suppliers  so  that  they  can 
consistently  improve  their  product/service 
quality.  
0  1.875  3.75  5.6  7.5   
43  Our  company  carries  out  supplier 
development programs on a regular basis. 
0  1.875  3.75  5.6  7.5   
44  Our  company  always  pays  its  suppliers 
according  to  contract  terms  and  industry 
practices. 
0  3  6.25  9  12.5   
45  There  are  no  complaints  from  suppliers 
towards our company. 
0  4  7.5  11  15   
f) On the position of government (10 points) 
46  Employment creation is a core, explicit 
policy of our firm. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
47  Facilitating the job of government at all 
levels is a core concern of our firm. 
0  0.75  1.5  2.25  3   
48  Our company always issues timely reports 
demanded by law (for example, those related 
to environmental variables). 
0  0.75  1.5  2.25  3   
49  Our  company  collaborates  with  government 
to  strengthen  transparency  in  our  industry, 
even beyond what the law demands. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
g) On society and the environment (45 points) 
50  Our company invests time and resources to 
strenghten operacional safety and security. 
0  3  6  9  12   
51  Our company conducts consultations with 
experts on industrial safety and its impact on 
society. 
0  3  6  9  12   
52  Our company actively collaborates with 
insurance companies and industry chambers 
in order to improve the quality of our 
industrial safety and health. 
0  2.75  5.5  8.25  11   
53  Our company offers all required industrial 
health-related information to the public and 
health authorities. 
0  1  2  3  4   
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   




Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
2. STAKEHOLDERS (500 POINTS) 
(Cont.) 




54  Our company works hard in order to avoid 
damaging the environment. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
55  Our company is aware of the importance of 
saving natural resources and works to that 
end. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
56  Our  company  develops  social  initiatives  in 
order to help the community. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
 
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   
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Questions  Answers and assigned score 
3. THE BOARD (300 POINTS) 




a) Board’s routine (20 points) 
57  Does the board meet less than once per 
quarter?  
0  3.5   
 
58  Does the board always meet with the 
presence of top management? 
0  3.5   
 
59  Is it necessary to establish a clear division of 
labor among directors? 
0  3   
 
60  Is it necessary to establish a clear division of 
labor between the board and the CEO? 
0  3   
 
61  Is it necessary to establish rules related to the 
evaluation and follow-up of the board  
decisions? 
0  1.5   
 
62  Is it necessary to establish fixed rules related 
to board meetings, calls, agenda preparation, 
etc.? 
0  3   
 
63  Does your company evaluate the board’s 
work on an annual basis?  
1.5  0   
 
64  Does your company evaluate the board’s 
work after each meeting (or after a 
significative number of meetings)? 






Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
3. THE BOARD (300 POINTS) 
(Cont.) 




b) Board’s ability and compromise (160 points) 
65  The board has general ability in at least two 
areas of knowledge that are relevant to the 
firm. 
0  2  5  15  30   
66  The board has familiarity with the conditions 
of the industry. 
0  2  5  15  30   
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   
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ber 
Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
3. THE BOARD (300 POINTS) 
(Cont.) 




67  The board has familiarity with the firm’s 
operations. 
0  2  5  15  30   
68  Directors are always well prepared for board 
meetings. 
0  1.5  3.75  11.25  22.5   
69  Directors are always commited to their duties 
during board meetings. 
0  1.5  3.75  11.25  22.5   
70  In addition to top management’s reports, the 
board usually collects its own information on 
the progress of strategic decisions. 
0  1  2  6  12.5   
71  Board  members  usually  make  incisive 
questions  relative  to  top  management’s 
proposals. 
0  1  2  6  12.5   
c) On the board’s composition and behavior (35 points) 
72  There is a variety of directors in our firm’s  
board. (
·) 
0  0.7  1.4  1.7  2   
73  In our company there has been no cases in 
which a manager or a director has a conflict 
of interests in transactions with related parties 
(for example, that an external director works 
for a firm with which our company plans to 
make a transaction.) 
0  6.25  12.5  18.75  25   
74  During the last three years there has been in 
our company no disciplinary measure to the 
board or top management for violation of 
comercial law. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
75  During the last three years none of our 
directors has been sanctioned for violating 
her fiduciary duties. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
76  Top management’s salary and benefits are 
related to company performance. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
77  The board has an agenda on management 
evaluation. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2   
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   
 
· If the company does not consider important having a variety of directors (internal directors, external 
directors, directors representing venture capital firms, etc.), you can assign to this question is maximum 
score  and continue with question 73.   47 
Num-
ber 
Questions  Answers and assigned score
* 
3. THE BOARD (300 POINTS) 
(Cont.) 




d) Control and monitoring (35 points) 
78  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to initiate decisions on markets, 
customers, employees, products, technology, 
budgets, etc. 
0  3  6  9  12   
79  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to ratify decisions on markets, 
customers, employees, products, technology, 
budgets, etc. 
0  2  4  6  8   
80  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to support the management team in 
implementing decisions on markets, 
customers, employees, products, technology, 
budgets, etc. 
0  2.5  5  7.5  10   
81  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to monitor decisions on markets, 
customers, employees, products, technology, 
budgets, etc. 
0  1.25  2.5  3.75  5   
e) Advice and networking activities (50 points) 
82  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to give advice relative to general 
administration, legal topics, economic and 
financial topics, technical issues, marketing, 
etc.  
0  6.5  13  19.5  26   
83  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to contribute by affecting 
important parts of the environment, such as 
financial institutions, customer, and 
government bodies, in order to reduce 
uncertainty. 
0  3  6  9  12   
84  Our policy is that our directors must be 
commited to contribute by affecting 
important parts of the environment, in order 
to strenghten it and enhance its image and 
brand name. 
0  3  6  9  12   
 
                                                 
·  TD: I am in total disagreement with this statement. 
·  D: I am in disagreement with this statement. 
·  N: I neither agree nor disagree with this statement.  
·  A: I agree with this statement. 
·  TA: I am in total disagreement with this statement.   
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TOTAL RESULTS 
 




COMPONENT  1:  General  principles  of 
governance 
0  57  114  147  200   
a) Explicit consideration of governance  0  43  86  113  130   
b) On information provision  0  14  28  34  40   
a) Directors´ representativeness  0  *  *  *  15   
b) CEO duality  0  *  *  *  15   
COMPONENT 2: Stakeholders  
0  126.75  250  372.25  500   
a) On the position of shareholders in the 
firm 
0  59  115  171  230   
b) On the position of employees in the 
firm 
0  20  40  60  80   
c) On the position of customers in the 
firm  
0  14  27.5  41  55   
d) On the position of banking and non-
banking creditors in the firm  
0  6.25  12.5  18.75  25   
e) On the position of suppliers in the 
firm  
0  13.75  27.5  40.25  55   
f) On the position of government   0  2.5  5  7.5  10   
g) On society in general and the 
environment 
0  11.25  22.5  33.75  45   
COMPONENTE3:  The board 
0  41.2  86.9  170.2  300   
a) Board´s routine  0  *  *  *  20   
b) Board´s ability and compromise  0  11  26.5  80  160   
c) On the composition and behavior of 
the board 
0  8.95  17.9  26.45  35   
d) Control and monitoring  0  8.75  17.5  26.25  35   
e) Advice and networking activities  0  12.5  25  37.5  50   
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